Example
AEROSPACE = AVIATION_STANDARD × CANONIC
= Structure(aviation) × (C1, C2, Temporal, Relational, C5, C6)
Lattice: 6 governance checks = ENTERPRISE (#63)
| Dimension | Bit | Aerospace Governance |
|---|---|---|
| C1 | private | Airworthiness declarations — certification basis, compliance checklists, safety objectives |
| C2 | private | Certification evidence — test reports, analysis, simulation, flight test data, FAI |
| T (Temporal) | 4 | Certification timing — maintenance intervals, airworthiness directives, life limits |
| R (Relational) | 8 | Airspace boundaries — operating limitations, route restrictions, separation minima |
| C5 | private | Flight operations — normal/abnormal/emergency procedures, dispatch requirements |
| C6 | private | Aircraft architecture — ATA chapters, system segregation, redundancy, EWIS |
| DAL | Failure Condition | MAGIC Tier | Bits | Governance |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DAL E | No Effect | COMMUNITY | #35 | Basic quality, no safety objectives |
| DAL D | Minor | BUSINESS | #43 | Limited safety objectives, minimal independence |
| DAL C | Major | ENTERPRISE | #63 | Full governance, 62 objectives |
| DAL B | Hazardous | AGENT | #127 | + C7 governance, 69 objectives, 18 independent |
| DAL A | Catastrophic | MAGIC | #255 | Full bitwise governance, 71 objectives, 33 independent |
`` Standard: DO-178C, DO-254, ARP4754A, ARP4761, AS9100D DAL Range: DAL A-E Governance: ENTERPRISE (#63) minimum for flight-critical Application: Transport aircraft (Part 25), regional jets, turboprops Key Systems: Flight management (FMS), autopilot, engine control (FADEC), avionics Regulation: FAA (US), EASA (EU), TCCA (Canada), ANAC (Brazil) Innovation: MAGIC checkset governs software lifecycle gates, certification evidence chain `
` Standard: MIL-STD-882E (System Safety), MIL-HDBK-516C, STANAG 4671 (UAV) DAL Range: DAL A-C (flight critical), SWCL 1-4 (mission systems) Governance: AGENT (#127) minimum for weapons-capable Application: Fighters, bombers, tankers, surveillance, trainers Key Systems: Mission computers, weapons delivery, EW, ISR sensors Regulation: NAVAIR, AFLCMC, AMCOM airworthiness authorities Innovation: MAGIC checkset governs mission-safety boundary, classification-aware governance `
` Standard: NASA-STD-8719.13 (Software Safety), ECSS-Q-ST-80C, DO-178C (adapted) DAL Range: Criticality 1 (loss of life/vehicle) through Criticality 4 Governance: AGENT (#127) minimum for crewed systems Application: Launch vehicles, satellites, space stations, planetary probes Key Systems: GN&C, life support, propulsion, communications, payload Regulation: NASA (US), ESA (EU), FAA/AST (commercial launch) Innovation: MAGIC checkset governs autonomous operations in communication-delayed environments `
` Standard: ASTM F3548 (UTM), JARUS SORA, DO-178C (if certified airspace) DAL Range: DAL C-E (depending on SAIL/operation category) Governance: BUSINESS (#43) to ENTERPRISE (#63) Application: Inspection, delivery, agriculture, surveying, defense ISR Regulation: FAA Part 107/Part 135 (US), EASA U-space, specific/certified category Key Hazards: Loss of link, GPS denial, mid-air collision, ground impact Innovation: MAGIC checkset governs airspace boundaries, beyond visual line of sight (BVLOS) `
` Standard: DO-178C, FAR Part 27 (normal), Part 29 (transport) DAL Range: DAL A-D Governance: ENTERPRISE (#63) minimum Application: Helicopters, tiltrotors, eVTOL/urban air mobility (UAM) Key Systems: Flight control (fly-by-wire), HUMS, autorotation systems Regulation: FAA, EASA, special conditions for eVTOL (SC-VTOL) Innovation: MAGIC checkset governs novel eVTOL certification pathways `
` Standard: DO-178C, FAR Part 23 (normal category), ASTM F3264 DAL Range: DAL B-E Governance: BUSINESS (#43) minimum Application: Single-engine piston, light twins, light sport aircraft Key Systems: EFIS, autopilot, engine monitoring, ADS-B Out Regulation: FAA Part 23 Amendment 64 (performance-based), EASA CS-23 Innovation: MAGIC checkset enables cost-effective governance for GA avionics ``
| Standard | Scope | Governance |
|---|---|---|
| DO-178C | Airborne software certification | DAL A-E → MAGIC checkset tier |
| DO-254 | Airborne electronic hardware | DAL A-E → MAGIC checkset tier |
| AS9100D | Aerospace quality management | ENTERPRISE (#63) |
| FAR Part 25 | Transport category aircraft | AGENT (#127) |
| EASA CS-25 | Large aeroplane certification | AGENT (#127) |
| MIL-STD-882E | System safety (defense) | ENTERPRISE (#63) |
| ARP4754A | Aircraft/system development | ENTERPRISE (#63) |
| ARP4761 | Safety assessment process | ENTERPRISE (#63) |
| DO-326A/DO-356A | Airworthiness security | ENTERPRISE (#63) |
| JARUS SORA | UAS specific operations risk | BUSINESS (#43) |
Gap: No existing system provides governance-gated airborne system development with O(1) bitwise compliance checking across Design Assurance Levels and certification authorities.
| Competitor | Approach | MAGIC checkset Distinction |
|---|---|---|
| Boeing/Airbus certified systems | DO-178C/DO-254 compliance, rigorous V&V | Hardware safety assurance, no bitwise governance language |
| Honeywell Avionics | Certified flight-critical systems | Proven certification track, no governance abstraction layer |
| Collins Aerospace | Integrated avionics suites | System integration, no O(1) compliance checking |
| Wind River VxWorks 653 | ARINC 653 RTOS, IMA platform | Platform certification, no governance gates |
| AdaCore GNAT Pro | Certified Ada/SPARK compilers | Language-level assurance, no bitwise governance encoding |
| PROV | Relevance | Claims |
|---|---|---|
| PROV-006 | PRIMARY | Governance-gated airborne system certification, DAL mapping, airspace enforcement |
| PROV-001 | Foundational | MAGIC private-check encoding for aerospace governance verification |
| PROV-003 | Supporting | Federated fleet learning — distributed aircraft fleet governance |
| PROV-004 | Supporting | Transcompilation of DO-178C/ARP4754A to governed executables |
AEROSPACE × DEFENSE = Military aviation (MIL-STD-882E + DO-178C)
AEROSPACE × ROBOTICS = Drone systems, autonomous aircraft (DO-178C + ISO 10218)
AEROSPACE × MANUFACTURING = Aircraft production governance (AS9100D + NADCAP)
AEROSPACE × QUALITY = Aerospace quality systems (AS9100D + AS9102 + ISO 9001)
AEROSPACE × AUTOMOTIVE = eVTOL / flying cars (DO-178C + ISO 26262)
AEROSPACE × ENERGY = Aircraft electrification, SAF governance (DO-178C + IEC 61508)
AEROSPACE × LOGISTICS = Air cargo, fleet operations (ARP4754A + ISO 3691-4)
AEROSPACE × SECURITY = Airworthiness cybersecurity (DO-326A + IEC 62443)
8 cross-domain compositions. Each strengthens PROV-006 patent claims.
No aircraft system may operate without certification from a recognized airworthiness authority. The authority’s determination is sovereign.
Example: An avionics system intended for Part 25 transport aircraft MUST hold a TSO authorization or equivalent. The FAA DER or ODA MUST approve the certification basis before any credit is taken for the system’s safety contribution.
Certification is not a one-time event. Systems MUST maintain airworthiness throughout operational life via inspection, maintenance, and modification governance.
Example: An Airworthiness Directive (AD) mandates inspection of engine fan blades every 3,000 cycles. The maintenance tracking system MUST enforce the interval. No dispatch if overdue. AD compliance status MUST trace to the specific serial-numbered part.
Every change to a certified system MUST be governed. No modification without impact analysis and approval authority.
Example: A software patch to the Flight Management System changes the terrain database format. Even a non-safety change requires DO-178C change impact analysis, regression testing per the original DAL, and DER approval before installation on any aircraft.
The certification basis (applicable regulations + special conditions + exemptions) is the law for that aircraft type. All evidence MUST trace to it.
Example: A new eVTOL aircraft operates under SC-VTOL-01 special conditions. The certification basis includes Part 23, specific DO-178C objectives at DAL B, and special conditions for distributed electric propulsion. Every compliance finding MUST reference a specific paragraph of the certification basis.
Safety-critical findings MUST be independently verified. The developer and the verifier MUST NOT be the same person or organization for DAL A/B.
Example: DO-178C Table A-7 requires 33 objectives with independence for DAL A software. The developer writes the code. An independent team performs structural coverage analysis and reviews test cases. The DER reviews both. Three separate organizations, each accountable.
`` DECLARE(DO178C_Certification) = DO178C × CANONIC
Where: DO-178C provides Structure: - Planning process (SDP, SVP, SCMP, SQAP) - Development process (requirements, design, code) - Verification process (reviews, analysis, testing) - Configuration management process - Quality assurance process
CANONIC provides Governance: - C1: Software safety objectives per DAL - C2: Verification evidence (test results, reviews, coverage) - Temporal: Certification timeline, modification history - Relational: Applicant/DER/ODA/FAA authorities - C5: Development lifecycle execution - C6: DO-178C/DO-330/DO-331 conformance
Result: DO178C_Certification at DAL A = MAGIC (#255)
Certification Lifecycle: Plan — SDP/SVP/SCMP approved Develop — Requirements/design/code complete Verify — Testing and analysis complete Review — Stage of Involvement audits passed Certify — Type certificate issued `
` DECLARE(MilitaryAirworthiness) = MIL_HDBK_516C × CANONIC
Where: MIL-HDBK-516C provides Structure: - Airworthiness qualification criteria - Flight envelope definition - Structural integrity - Subsystem safety assessment - Software safety (AMCOM/NAVAIR)
CANONIC provides Governance: - C1: Airworthiness claims per system - C2: Qualification test evidence, flight test data - Temporal: Type certificate timeline, modification tracking - Relational: Service airworthiness authority boundaries - C5: Flight operations (normal/abnormal/emergency) - C6: MIL-STD/DO-178C conformance
Result: MilitaryAirworthiness = AGENT (#127) minimum
Qualification Lifecycle: Define — Operational requirements document Design — Preliminary design review Test — Developmental test & evaluation Qualify — Operational test & evaluation Authorize — Military type certificate ``
| Validator | Checks | Example Failure |
|---|---|---|
| C1 | Airworthiness claims stated with DAL assignment | System without safety objective |
| C2 | Certification evidence complete per DO-178C/DO-254 | Missing structural coverage analysis |
| Temporal | Maintenance intervals, AD compliance, life limits | Dispatched with overdue inspection |
| Relational | Certification authority jurisdiction, operating limitations | Flying outside approved airspace |
| C5 | Operations procedures executed per flight manual | Startup without checklist completion |
| C6 | DO-178C/ARP4754A/AS9100D conformance | Non-compliant software lifecycle |
To create a CANONIC aerospace vertical:
Identify aircraft/system category (Part 23/25, military, space, UAS) Determine DAL from system safety assessment and map to MAGIC tier Create scope with CANON.md inheriting /AEROSPACE/ Define airworthiness claims per certification basis Map to certification standard (DO-178C, DO-254, ARP4754A) Implement validators for evidence chain, configuration control, independent verification Document coverage with certification artifacts
Result: Owned aerospace vertical with certification-grade governance.
| *AEROSPACE | SPECIFICATION | VERTICALS | INDUSTRIES* |